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ETHICS OR EXPEDIENCY: AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUESTION 
By Douglas H. Strong* and Elizabeth S. Rosenfield** 
INTRODUCTION 
Most ethical systems existing in the world today fail to take into 
account the need for a healthful physical and social environment in 
which the human species can survive and the human spirit thrive. 
Economist Robert Heilbroner noted recently that "affluence does 
not buy morale, a sense of community, or even a quiescent conform-
ity.'" As the quality of life on earth declines, the Western, indivi-
dualistic model of behavior based on the pursuit of self-interest and 
material improvement is losing credence. We struggle to make ad-
justments that will satisfy the poor and aspiring classes and nations 
while protecting the interests of the advantaged, but lack adequate 
ethical principles to guide us. 
Americans as well as all other peoples of the world have two 
choices in response to the rising tide of social and environmental 
crises: begin now to seek guidelines for meeting such fundamental 
problems as how to achieve a better distribution of the world's 
wealth and how to protect the world's physical resources from ulti-
mate exhaustion, or wait until drastic change is forced upon us by 
the severity of the problems which we have helped to create. We can 
adopt new social and environmental ethics now or wait until human 
degradation and environmental deterioration threaten our very ex-
istence.2 Whichever path we elect to follow, we must recognize that 
the future depends upon our present decisions, and that neither as 
individuals nor as a society can we escape responsibility for them. 
* Professor of History, San Diego State University, San Diego, California. 
** J.D., Stanford University. Resides in Atherton, California. 
I R. Heilbroner, The Human Prospect, 20 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 24, 1974, 
at 26. 
2 INSTITUTE OF ECOLOGY, MAN IN THE LIVING ENVIRONMENT (1972); B. WARD and R. DUBOS, 
ONLY ONE EARTH (1972); D. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). 
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To draw a line between environmental ethics and social ethics 
may seem artificial and arbitrary since every environmental prob-
lem is in some sense a social problem. For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, "environment" is used to mean physical envi-
ronment as distinguished from social environment, and is limited 
still further to mean natural physical environment. A tenement 
house is certainly part of the physical environment of those who live 
in it, but whether the existence of such a dwelling is right or wrong 
is not a question of environmentaL ethics within the present defini-
tion. "Ethics," on the other hand, is used in a very broad sense to 
mean any value system by which to judge the rightness or wrongness 
and the desirability or wisdom of our actions and objectives. 
Decisions on environmental issues are peculiarly difficult to 
make. As individuals we tend to be guided by personal considera-
tions, as members of a society we tend to be guided by the society's 
cultural patterns, and as members of a species we must ultimately 
be guided by what is needful if the species is to survive. Thus the 
factors that influence our decisions range from the purely indivi-
dualistic and hedonistic at one extreme to the purely biological at 
the other. Inevitably, personal inclination, cultural patterns, and 
concern for humans as a species will often be in conflict. For this 
reason alone we need ethical guidelines to help us make valid deci-
SIOns. 
How, for example, should we answer such questions as the follow-
ing. Should couples be free to choose the number of children they 
will have, or should we, since there is a limit to the number of people 
the earth can support, begin to restrict the right to reproduce?3 Is it 
justifiable to close down a factory that is causing a high degree of 
pollution, or to prohibit the manufacture of automobiles that use 
excessive quantities of fuel, even though these actions cause unem-
ployment?4 Should we stress the immediate needs of people alive 
today or the quality of the environment that will be our legacy to 
future generations? How should we balance our desire for individual 
freedom with the need for social controls to assure the survival and 
welfare of mankind? 
In looking for criteria to help us answer these and similar ques-
a D. Callahan, Ethics and Population Limitation, 175 SCIENCE 487-94 (Feb. 4, 1972); P. 
EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT (1970). 
• P. Drucker, Saving the Crusade, 244 HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1972, at 66-71; N. Fara-
melli, Ecological Responsibility and Economic Justice, in WESTERN MAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS 188-203 (I. Barbour ed. 1973). 
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tions, this article will start by examining two ethical systems that 
have contributed to our present difficulties, and will ask how they 
could be amended to serve us better. 
I. THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN ETHIC 
Many recent commentators on environmental ethics begin with 
a discussion of Christian attitudes toward nature. Historian Lynn 
White Jr.'s controversial thesis, for example, is that the root of the 
ecological crisis lies in our Judeo-Christian heritage. White's belief 
is that the Christian teaching that nature exists apart from people 
and was created for their use has encouraged the unchecked devel-
opment of science and technology at the expense of the environ-
ment and that as long as Western society maintains its basic Chris-
tian values-including the "Christian axiom that nature has no 
reason for existence save to serve man" -we shall suffer a "worsen-
ing ecological crisis."5 
Critics of White's thesis argue that he overemphasizes the influ-
ence of religion on our beliefs about nature and on the way we have 
treated the environment. Biologist Richard Wright, for example, 
agrees with White that Christianity nurtured science and technol-
ogy in its early growth, but insists that scientists themselves, not 
Christianity, are responsible for the destruction caused by their 
activities and discoveries.8 Social scientist Lewis Moncrief, while he 
does not discount the influence of religion, stresses the impact of the 
democratic revolution and the scientific-technological revolutions of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a cause of environmental 
degradation today.7 Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan points out that the 
Christian West is not alone in its destructiveness. Even traditional 
China with its adaptive attitude toward nature has greatly altered 
and damaged its landscape through deforestation and consequent 
erosion.8 Rene Dubos, even more critical of White, maintains that 
the ecological crisis today "has nothing to do with the Judeo-
Christian tradition" but results from the pursuit of short-term eco-
5 L. White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203-07 (March 
10, 1967). 
• R. Wright, Responsibility for the Ecological Crisis, 20 BIOSCIENCE 351-53 (Aug. 1, 1970). 
7 L. Moncrief, The Cultural Basis of Our Environmenta(Crisis, 170 SCIENCE 508-72 (Oct. 
30, 1970). 
• Yi-Fu-Tuan, Discrepancies Between Environmental Attitude and Behavior: Examples 
from Europe and China, 12 CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 176-90 (1968); and Tuan, Our Treatment 
of the Environment in Ideal and Actuality, 58 AMERICAN SciENTIST, May-June 1970, at 244-
49. 
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nomic self-interest.9 
White has recently assured his many critics that he is well aware 
that religion is not the sole cause of the ecological crisis, that ecolog-
ical damage was widespread prior to the rise of Christianity, and 
that it is widespread in non-Christian societies today.lO He has said 
also that to understand a society's value system we sometimes need 
to rely "less on what that society says about itself than on what it 
actually does." Nevertheless, reaffirming his original thesis, he ins-
ists that in the last analysis our society is a product of individual 
beliefs about who we are, where we are going, and how we ought to 
behave toward nature and our fellow man-in other words, a prod-
uct of our religion and our "value structures." 
While White has concentrated on £he effect of the Judeo-
Christian tradition on the rise of science and technology in the past 
1,000 years, David Crownfield has argued that our present irrespon-
sible attitude toward the earth's resources can be traced to the pre-
Christian seminomadic Hebrew sheepmen who were always able to 
move their flocks to greener pastures, leaving behind the land that 
had been over-grazed and eroded. Their profligate use of the land 
was encouraged by their belief in a divine shepherd who would 
intervene miraculously and deliver them from their earthly trou-
bles. Meanwhile, during their secular existence, the earth and its 
resources were theirs to use as they saw fit. Calvinists would later 
argue that only by full use of all that earth had to offer did people 
show their readiness to migrate to heaven. 11 
Not only historians but a growing number of theologians are in-
quiring into the relationship between Christian ethics and the envi-
ronmental crisis. Although Richard A. Baer, Jr., Frederick Elder, 
Joseph Sittler, and others disagree somewhat on the meaning of 
Scripture, they fear that some interpretations of the Bible have 
encouraged an arrogant attitude toward nature. They are calling for 
an interpretation of Genesis that sees human "dominion over the 
earth" as a kind of trusteeship. They believe that people were 
placed on earth to "tend God's garden," and that this being so, they 
have no absolute right to the land or its fruits.12 
, R. DUBOS, THE GENIUS OF THE PLACE, Horace M. Albright Conservation Lectureship X 
(University of California School of Forestry, 1970). 
III L. White, Jr., Continuing the Conversation, in WESTERN MAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS, 55-64 (I. Barbour ed. 1973). 
II D. Crownfield, The Curse of Abel: An Essay in Biblical Ecology, 258 THE NORTH AMERI-
CAN REVIEW, Summer 1973, at 58-63. See also P. CARROLL, PURITANISM AND THE WILDERNESS 
(1969). 
12 For example, see F. ELDER, CRISIS IN EDEN: A RELIGIOUS STUDY OF MAN AND ENVIRONMENT 
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One recent interpreter of the Bible, David Crownfield, suggests 
that the Garden of Eden (before the fall) was a stable plant and 
animal community}3 Humans were fruit-gatherers who cooperated 
with all other living things in a self-sustaining environment; the 
apple tree and all fruitful plants reseeded themselves and shared 
their abundance with other residents of the garden. Certainly not 
only Jesus but other early Christians lived simple lives close to the 
land and preached kinship with the earth and all living things. Also 
speaking in this vein, theologian Sittler reflected the thought of 
many enlightened churchmen when he stated that the solution of 
the environmental crisis was to be found in "joyful and intelligent 
fellowship with our sister the earth-and that concept, utterly basic 
to the massive changes we must make if we are to survive as human 
beings, is a religious concept, a spiritual vision."14 
II. THE PRAGMATIC-UTILITARIAN ETHIC 
The second ethical system believed to have contributed to our 
environmental problems is the Pragmatic-Utilitarian ethic es-
poused by most Americans today. As popularly interpreted, this 
approach has become an ethic of expediency. Whatever is of the 
greatest immediate benefit to the greatest number of people at the 
lowest cost is judged desirable or "good," and therefore moral. 
The primary problem is not with the theory that the greatest 
benefit at the lowest cost is good, but with the failure to take into 
account future good as well as present good. The shortsighted poli-
cies stemming from this philosophy have been ecologically disas-
trous. One outstanding example is the dust-bowl of the American 
midwestern plains, which resulted from over-grazing and over-
ploughing the land. The indigenous buffalo-grass had held the soil 
against the periodic droughts and merciless winds. When it was 
ploughed under the preparation for crop-planting, the operation 
could have been said to be benefitting the greatest number at the 
lowest cost. The long-term effect was anything but beneficial, how-
(1970); F. SCHAEFFER, POLLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN: THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ECOLOGY 
(1970); R. Baer, Jr., Land Misuse: A Theological Concern, 83 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1239-41 
(Oct. 12, 1966); and R. Baer, Conservation: An Arena for the Church's Concern, 86 CHRISTIAN 
CENTURY 40-43 (Jan. 8, 1969); J. Sittler, 8, 1969; J. Sittler, Jr., A Theology for Earth, 37 THE 
CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR 367-74 (June 1954); G. Fackre, Ecology and Theology, in WESTERN MAN 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, 116-31 (Ian G. Barbour ed. 1973); 
13 D. Crownfield, supra note 11, at 60-62. 
" J. Sittler, Two Temptations-Two Corrections, 45 NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION 
MAGAZINE, December 1971, at 21. 
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ever, and everyone suffered. Over-grazing, strip-mining, dumping 
factory wastes into lakes and rivers, the indiscriminate use of pesti-
cides-all of these practices have been justified as "practical" and 
therefore right. 
A utilitarian ethic naturally makes for very flexible standards of 
conduct. Biologist Garrett Hardin argued, for instance, that "the 
morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time 
it is performed."15 The frontiersman who polluted a nearby stream 
did not necessarily harm anyone if his closest neighbor was over 20 
miles away. Nor was he culpable if he "wasted" resources that were 
greater than anyone's need for them. Today, in a crowded world 
with depleted resources, comparable behavior would be immoral. 
By the same token, freedom to reproduce according to individual 
election is no longer defensible in as much as it threatens to result 
in a population that the earth cannot support. Every human being 
in order to exist must consume a share of the earth's air and water 
and other essential resources, and none of these resources is inex-
haustible. Hardin sees the unrestricted use of the land and its re-
sources, coupled with the pursuit of individual self-interest, as ruin 
for all. The state of the system has so changed that what was once 
ethical is no longer SO.18 
Whether the Judeo-Christian Bible is reinterpreted, or the 
Pragmatic-Utilitarian ethic reformulated, we obviously need a more 
clearly defined ethical principle by which to judge whether any 
course of conduct that affects our environment is right or wrong. 
The hazards of our present unguided course are plain to be seen. A 
correlation clearly exists between an increased prevalence of degen-
erative diseases and nervous disorders, and an increase in pollution 
of air and water, in contamination of foods, in exposure to radiation, 
and in urban expansion at the expense of open country. Since those 
who have adapted best to the environmental conditions created by 
over-population and over-industrialization are most likely to sur-
vive, in generations to come we could conceivably propagate a phys-
ically and mentally inferior species, not only suited to an anthill 
existence but content with it.17 
" G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1245 (Dec. 13, 1968). 
" [d. 
17 R. DUBOS, MAN, MEDICINE, AND ENVIRONMENT 103-06 (1968); R. DUBOS, So HUMAN AN 
ANIMAL 16-17, 63-77, 144-60 (1968); J. LIVINGSTON, ONE COSMIC INSTANT 225 (1973). 
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III. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 
Of many suggestions IS that have been made, one of the most 
promising is that we begin our search for ethical guidelines by look-
ing at our biological past. Our aim would be to determine, if possi-
ble, the sort of environment most conducive to mankind's health 
and well-being. People are unique among animals, but they are 
animals, and like all other life on earth, the product of evolution. 
They can reasonably assume, therefore, that the environment to 
which they are genetically best suited is the natural environment in 
which they evolved, that is, their global environment before they 
began to change it. 19 
In The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game,20 ecologist Paul 
Shepard discusses primitive peoples who accepted the world as they 
found it and learned to live in harmony with it. Shepard says: 
We commonly hold that we want a society that operates economically 
and nearer to a steady state, a life that enables us to achieve personal 
fulfillment, enough small group contact to let us have a consistent body 
of close friends, the means for according a respect for all of living things, 
a sense of connectedness of life, of atunement and alertness. Such is a 
description of those primitive people. 21 
Shepard goes on to point out that aboriginal peoples lived a remark-
ably good life in which the equivalent of only two or three days a 
week were spent in providing for his sustenance. These peoples 
spent most of their time in peaceful "socializing, sleeping, dancing, 
visiting, being hosts, telling stories, playing with children, making 
music." They lived in a "rich, stable, and diverse environment" and 
maintained a healthy and alert population that the land could com-
fortably support.22 
This remarkably successful adaptation of humans to their envi-
ronment began to break down some 10,000 years ago with the rise 
" Among the most useful proposals are the following: E. GOLDSMITH, BLUEPRINT FOR 
SURVIVAL (1972); THE CALIFORNIA TOMORROW PLAN (A. Heller ed. 1971) . 
.. H. litis, O. Loucks, and P. Andrews, Criteria for an Optimum Human Environment, 26 
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 2-6 (Jan. 1970). 
"' P. SHEPARD, THE TENDER CARNIVORE AND THE SACRED GAME (1973). 
21 P. Shepard, Hunting for a Better Ecology, 258 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 
1973 at 15. For a brief account of the African Bushmen, see M. Sahlins, The Original Affluent 
Society, 4 ECOLOGIST 181-89 (June 1974). See also Kenneth MacLeisch's account of the Tasa-
day, Stone Age Cavemen of Mindanao, 142 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, 218-49 (Aug. 
1972). 
22 P. Shepard, Hunting for a Better Ecology, 258 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 1973, 
at 13. 
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of agriculture. Shepard thinks that the objectives of the herders 
and farmers who appeared on the scene derived from the nature of 
their activities; " ... they all shared the aim of completely human-
izing the earth's surface, replacing wild with domestic, and creating 
landscapes from habitat."23 Each person tried to maximize his or 
her share of space and goods. 
In time the values and characteristics of the former hunter-
gatherers changed. Diversity gave way to uniformity, life became 
geared to the drudgery of production, to competition, and to regi-
mentation, and "civilized" people set themselves apart from na-
ture. 24 When the demands of an increasing population exceeded the 
capacity of the land to provide for it, wars, epidemics, and famines 
resulted, followed by serfdom and slavery.25 In brief, Shepard con-
tends that the golden age of humans ended with this fundamental 
shift in their way of life and sense of relationship to the land, and 
that today we suffer the consequences of having remade our environ-
ment. 26 
While Shepard may be criticized for his glorification of our "pri-
mitive" past, much can be learned from a study of earlier values in 
relation to our present values and our hopes for the future. Precivil-
ized people regarded the cosmos as a whole and made no distinction 
between personal, natural, and sacred worlds. They believed that 
humans and the nonhuman world were bound together in a single 
moral order, and that they had an obligation to care for the whole, 
of which they were a part. Many American Indians taught their 
children the concept of "immanent justice"-the idea that the 
physical universe is not indifferent to what one does, and that the 
land itself exacts retribution for its misuse. 27 
"Civilized" individuals, on the other hand, teach that the uni-
verse has no moral quality, that it is indifferent to them, and that 
they owe it nothing. And they teach that, far from being an integral 
part of the universe, they are beings of a different order, with the 
natural world and all of its resources there for them to exploit as 
they choose.28 In the words of one author: 
'" P. Shepard, THE TENDER CARNIVORE AND THE SACRED GAME 237 (1973). 
,. [d. at 239. 
" [d. at 16-26. 
" [d. at 35-36. 
27 R. REDFIELD, THE PRIMITIVE WORLD AND ITS TRANSFORMATION 107-08 (1953). 
" John A. Livingston has traced the religious roots of the environmental crisis to paleolithic 
man who utilized the magic of cave paintings in an attempt to improve his chances for 
successful hunting. This, according to Livingston, was the beginning of man's conception of 
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The contemporary Western world, now imitated by the Orient, tends 
to regard the relationship of man to nature as a relation of man to 
physical matter in which application of physical science to man's mate-
rial comfort is man's paramount assignment on earth. 29 
No matter how appealing Shepard's picture of this primitive way 
of life may be, we have come too far to return to those ways. Our 
lifestyles and the means by which we support ourselves, both de-
pendent on industry, are too firmly entrenched. Not many of us 
would be willing to relinquish the bathtub with hot running water 
for an icy natural pool, or a job of so many hours a day and a fair 
certainty of dinner for the chances of the hunt. We can, however, 
learn an invaluable lesson from the concern of early humankind for 
the well-being of the earth, and from the fact that this concern was 
reflected in their ethics and governed their behavior. A regard for 
nature similar to that of primitive peoples, and conspicuously lack-
ing in Judeo-Christian and Pragmatic-Utilitarian ethics, is the cor-
nerstone of an environmental ethic in any era. 
The environmental ethic formulated by Aldo Leopold over 25 
years ago provides a useful starting point in our efforts to evolve an 
environmental ethic for our own era.30 While a number of biologists 
and environmentalists have proposed ethical principles to guide us 
in making decisions that affect the environment, up to this time the 
principle proposed by Leopold is at once the most comprehensive 
and the simplest. 
Leopold's thesis was that all ethical systems so far evolved rest 
on a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community 
of interdependent parts. Ethics first dealt with the relationships 
between individuals and then with the relationship between the 
individual and the social community. Leopold's belief was that eth-
ics should be extended once more to include one's relationship to the 
natural world. This "land ethic," as he called it, simply enlarged the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and 
all species of animals, each member of which is dependent on each 
of the other members for its own healthy existence. As a "plain 
member and citizen of this community," to use Leopold's designa-
tion, each person owes respect and a duty to each of his or her fellow 
members and to the community as a whole.31 
himself as separate from nature and of his efforts to exercise domination over it. J. LIVINGS-
TON, ONE COSMIC INSTANT 134-46 (1973). 
,. REDFIELD, supra note 27, at 110. 
311 A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). 
31 [d. at 204. 
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Leopold's premises lead to the result that we are responsible for 
the "health" of the biotic community, which he defined as its "ca-
pacity for self renewal." He defined conservation as our effort to 
understand and preserve this capacity, and warned us that the de-
velopment of a land ethic required us to "quit thinking about decent 
land use as solely an economic problem," and to think of it also in 
ethical terms. "A thing is right," he said,' "when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise." He believed an ethic of this kind 
to be an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.32 
Leopold's concept of people as part of a biotic community made 
up of soils, water, plants, and other animals, although not as all-
embracing, resembles the primitive concept of being as one with the 
universe. The environmental ethics of these earlier peoples, how-
ever, were rooted in instinct and religion, whereas Leopold's were 
based on his understanding of biology. Unfortunately, as Leopold 
himself has pointed out, a great deal in the field of biology and 
especially in the field of ecology is still not known.33 
IV. TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 
Several steps are necessary in the development of an environ-
mental ethic. The first is to formulate a basic principle. Leopold 
provided such a principle: a thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, and 
wrong when it tends to do otherwise. Less explicitly, but with 
intent similar to Leopold's, environmentalist Joseph W. Meeker 
suggested that we try to understand the enormously complex 
world in which we live and then to "learn how to shape ourselves to 
please the world."34 In whatever way its fundamental principle is 
formulated, a responsible environmental ethic by its very nature 
imposes on people a duty to protect, preserve, and care for the 
natural physical world around them. 
Since a principle of this kind can be implemented only to the 
extent that we know what care the earth requires, the next step is 
to put our best minds to the task of learning as much as possible 
about the intricate biological processes on which the health of the 
32 [d. at 221, 224-25. 
33 [d., at 185-87 . 
.. J. Meeker, Prologue to an Environmental Ethic, 258 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, 
Summer 1973, at 22. See also J. MEEKER, THE COMEDY OF SURVIVAL: STUDIES IN LITERARY 
ECOWGY (1974). 
1976] ETHICS OR EXPEDIENCY 265 
biotic community depends, and about which so little is fully under-
stood. We know, of course, that once a species of plant or animal 
has been exterminated, there is no way to recreate it. Also, man-
kind's ultimate survival depends upon the ultimate survival of other 
species. Even were the prospect inviting, we could not solve our 
environmental problems by living alone under geodesic domes in a 
man-made environment. To do so would be a biological impossibil-
ity. 
We do not know how many species of plants and animals we dare 
to exterminate, either intentionally or inadvertently-by air, water 
or soil pollution-before we risk toppling the biotic pyramid and 
ourselves with it. In the vast complex of nature, what are the biolog-
ical functions of each constituent? Is there any species of plant or 
animal, no matter how apparently valueless, that does not serve 
some purpose not yet understood? How much modification can our 
environment stand and still support human life? These are very 
difficult, long-range questions that are not likely to be answered 
soon. 
Meanwhile innumerable questions of immediate concern need to 
be answered. These range from how best to dispose of industrial and 
atomic wastes, to how aerosol propellants affect the earth's protec-
tive shield against cosmic rays. Until such time as more money and 
trained personnel are available, research of the kind required to 
solve problems such as these would have to proceed at the expense 
of some other types of research now in progress. A great deal of time 
and energy is presently devoted to the development of new drugs 
and elaborate techniques and equipment for the treatment of 
chronic diseases, many of which, as noted earlier, are caused by 
adverse environmental conditions. With a new ethical principle to 
guide us, we would need to devote some of this energy and money 
to correcting as far as possible the conditions that cause the illnesses 
in the first place, and some to advancing our knowledge of ecology 
and biological processes in general. 
Despite the vast amount that is still not known, we currently have 
sufficient scientific data to enable us to start drawing up guidelines 
for an environmental ethic. Many facts of environmental import-
ance have been established and given wide publicity. The deleter-
ious effects of chlorinated hydrocarbons in pesticides, of phosphates 
in soaps and detergents, and of pollutants in the exhaust fumes of 
automobiles, have become matters of common knowledge. Every 
day newspapers and journals report new scientific findings related 
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to environmental problems. Each newly established fact would add 
another criterion of right and wrong to an environmental ethic, but 
development of such an ethic need not wait on new data or addi-
tional criteria. 
Assuming that we have formulated an ethical principle and have 
taken steps to implement it, we are still faced with the very difficult 
problem of procuring general acceptance of its tenets. In primitive 
societies common moral conceptions held the members of a com-
munity together. Because a whole community accepted the same set 
of values, including values related to the environment, extraordi-
nary pressures could be put on individuals to conform to environ-
mental rules.35 Modern society, however, is not in that enviable 
position. 
Hardin, who saw individualistic self-interest leading us to disas-
ter, believed that the only way to bring human conduct into line 
with environmental needs was by means of stringent, legal controls: 
"mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of people 
affected."36 Whatever the exact meaning of Hardin's formula, John 
J. McMahon took issue with the principle involved. McMahon be-
lieved that people were genetically programmed as much for cooper-
ative, altruistic behavior as for competition and that education 
could, of itself, create a sense of responsibility and a willingness to 
sacrifice personal interest.37 
Some argue in Hardin's defense that he simply had the courage 
to confront the reality of man's inherent egocentricity.3s Freedom to 
live a totally egocentric existence cannot be tolerated, and Hardin 
saw legal restrictions as offering the best chance for survival. 39 Har-
din, however, was relying too heavily on regulation per se. The ob-
servation that we cannot legislate morals has been borne out time 
and time again.40 As Leopold has noted, "the mechanism of opera-
35 Conformity to community values ensured stability, but at the cost of flexibility and 
change. Modem societies experience rapid change, but suffer from a breakdown in sense of 
community and security. See W. BURCH, JR., DAYDREAMS AND NIGHTMARES: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT 49 (1971). 
"0 G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1247 (Dec. 13, 1968). See also G. 
HARDIN, EXPLORING NEW ETHICS FOR SURVIVAL (1972). 
37 J. McMahon, Garrett Hardin and the Search for Ecological Morality, 37 THE LlvffiG 
WILDERNESS, Spring 1973, at 23-29. 
3. Margaret O. Strahl, Letter to the editor, in 37 THE LIVING WILDERNESS, Summer 1973, 
at 41-42. 
30 G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1247 (Dec. 13, 1968) . 
• n E.g., note the problems with laws to ban alcoholic beverages, certain books, and mari-
juana, or to restrict sexual activities. 
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tion is the same for any ethic: social approbation for right actions; 
social disapproval for wrong actions."(1 Once the ethical principles 
are widely accepted, approbation and disapproval follow as a matter 
of course. 
So far as the acceptance and implementation of an environmental 
ethic is concerned, a vision of the future and of a better, finer world 
is believed necessary to capture people's imaginations and inspire 
them to action!2 The reason given for this view is that an environ-
mental ethic looks not only to the present but to the future, a more 
distant future than any of us will live to see, and any appreciable 
number of individuals, unless motivated by a vision, will probably 
not concern themselves with what is so remote, nor make present 
personal sacrifices in the interest of generations yet to be born. A 
corollary of this view is that an environmental ethic will not succeed 
if it appeals only to self-interest. 
We should, of course, nurture dreams and visions of a better fu-
ture. Environmentalists, together with educators and sociologists, 
should set new goals such as adequate health care for everyone, 
improved housing in better designed communities, more equitable 
distribution of wealth, greater opportunity for creativity and self-
fulfillment, and an environment that would maintain the complex-
ity, diversity, and stability of all life on earth. Means of attaining 
these goals should be devised. A vision of such achievements does 
indeed capture the imagination. 
So far as the physical environment is concerned, however, the 
authors very much doubt that a vision, no matter how inspiring to 
a sizeable segment of society, is capable of engendering an ethic that 
will be accepted widely enough to be operable. Enough people can-
not probably be made to feel a sense of moral right and wrong in 
respect to environmental practices through the power of a vision. 
The authors believe that too many people in any modern society are 
incapable of sharing a vision of the sort required. 
More likely, the route to general acceptance of an environmental 
ethic will actually be by way of the much deplored concept of "self-
interest." Some, perhaps most, ethical systems have succeeded be-
cause they appealed to self-interest. The Judeo-Christian ethic of-
fers spiritual incentives to do God's bidding, backed up by the 
threat of punishment for transgressions-it "pays" to be good. The 
.. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, 225 (1949). 
" E.g., see L. Mumford Closing Statement, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH AMERICA 
718-29 (F. Darling & J. Milton eds. 1966). 
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Utilitarian ethic that exalts the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber also appeals to self-interest-so long as the individual regards 
himself as one of the greatest number. 
The appeal to self-interest in the case of an environmental ethic 
would be two-fold. With respect to the present, an appeal would be 
made to our very natural desire to live out a healthy life. We cannot 
escape ingesting or breathing the deleterious substances which we 
are releasing into our waters, soils, and air. Whether affected by 
sulphur compounds that travel from auto to air, or mercury that 
travels from factory to water to fish, our health inevitably suffers, 
although just how seriously will only be known as the evidence 
gradually accumulates. 
Looking to the distant future, the appeal would be to a natural 
interest in posterity. Most human beings, the authors believe, feel 
an identity with their species, and see in their descendants a kind 
of immortality for themselves. Consequently they have a personal 
interest in the continued existence of this earth and of humankind. 
The threat to the future is not, of course, that God will visit his 
wrath upon an erring world, but that the earth itself will take its 
vengeance. For every violation of its integrity, from the denuding of 
watersheds to the pollution of lakes and rivers, the earth exacts a 
price. The idea of "imminent justice" that was taught to American 
Indian children is beginning to appear as a simple but inescapable 
law of nature.43 
For an appeal to self-interest on these grounds to succeed, we 
must be convinced of the danger to ourselves and to posterity. If the 
facts are presented clearly and simply, however, the layper-son need 
not know a great deal about biology or ecology to understand the 
risks we run of causing irreparable damage or of starting irreversible 
and disastrous processes. How soon and how thoroughly he or she 
could be convinced would depend, if we can judge by the success of 
advertising methods, upon how thoroughly and repeatedly he or she 
was exposed to the facts. 
To persuade enough people who cannot share a vision that an 
urgent need exists for a new approach to environmental problems, 
to persuade them that whatever we do that affects the ecology is 
morally either right or wrong, to educate them to the point where 
they are willing to make personal sacrifices (as envisaged by McMa-
hon) is, to say the least, a formidable task. Educators at every 
teaching level, journalists of every order, the powers of radio and 
•• R. REDFIELD, THE PRIMITIVE WORLD AND ITs TRANSFORMATION, 107-08 (1953). 
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television, in fact all the powers of communication, would have to 
participate. To see it as an impossible task, however, is surely to 
lack another kind of vision. 
CONCLUSION 
Once an environmental ethic is adopted, what will be the answers 
to some of the questions posed earlier in this article? In the matter 
of personal freedom, the reconciliation of the individual's desire for 
independence on the one hand with the requirements of his neigh-
bors on the other has been an issue since the beginning of com-
munity life. An environmental ethic will simply add a duty not to 
cause harm to the land. To the individual's present duty not to 
cause harm to other members of society, this duty toward the land 
could in fact be considered as simply another duty toward society, 
since whatever affects the environment adversely will eventually 
harm everyone. Whether the question involves the size of one's fam-
ily or the cutting of trees on one's own property, the good of the earth 
will come first. What is ecologically sound will be right; what is 
ecologically unsound will be wrong. 
With respect to any course of action that protects or improves the 
condition of the environment at the expense of someone's job, the 
duty to the environment will be, by its very nature, greater than the 
duty to the job-holder. Readjustments can be made. At least the 
chance for another job exists. But the child crippled by mercury 
poisoning, or whose lungs are damaged irretrievably by polluted air, 
has no chance for another life. As for the question, should we use 
the earth today as we see fit at the expense of those who come after 
us, the answer is implicit in the ethic itself. Care of the earth is its 
essence, the present and future health of the earth its objective. 
To recapitulate, we suggest that enlightened self-interest can 
form the basis for an effective, generally acceptable environmental 
ethic.44 As for those who seek a vision and can be guided by one, 
what could be more inspiring than the vision of people learning to 
understand the earth in all its complexity, the vision of people com-
ing by reason and insight to see themselves as members of the biotic 
" An environmental ethic that is accepted and complied with because it appeals to one's 
self-interest is not, admittedly, on an altogether sound footing. Such a view continues in part 
the erroneous concept of one's separateness from nature. The authors believe, however, that 
an appeal to self-interest is the best if not the only hope for the adoption of an environmental 
ethic at the present time, when such an ethic is critically needed. Our hope is that ultimately 
people will recognize and accept the right of other species to exist simply for their own sake 
and not because people need them. 
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community, administrators of its laws, insurers of its health, cus-
todians of its beauty? For those who share this vision, an environ-
mental ethic already exists. 
